Why the transfer of bank supervisory powers back to the Bank of England is a step in the right direction: Revisiting the role of external auditors in bank and financial services supervision by Ojo, Marianne
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Why the transfer of bank supervisory
powers back to the Bank of England is a
step in the right direction: Revisiting the
role of external auditors in bank and
financial services supervision
Marianne Ojo
23. December 2012
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43387/
MPRA Paper No. 43387, posted 23. December 2012 04:30 UTC
1ABSTRACT
The need for  effective  supervision  of  capital  markets  is  becoming all  the  more  evident  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  recent  LIBOR and  rate  rigging  scandals.  Financial  regulators  or  indeed  bank 
regulators cannot perform such a function effectively without the involvement of auditors in the 
supervisory process.  A challenging task awaits  the incoming Bank of England Governor,  Mark 
Carney – particularly given the reduced involvement of auditors in the bank supervisory process 
since  the  time  of  assumption  of  the  Financial  Services  Authority's  bank supervisory functions. 
However, he (as well as other recent financial reforms) may prove to be the much needed boost 
required in the bank and indeed, financial supervisory process.
This  paper  is  aimed at  highlighting why the transfer  of  bank supervision back  to  the  Bank of 
England is required if further progress is to be made in the effective regulation and supervision of 
the financial services sector. It also highlights shortcomings which exist and need to be addressed if 
the  Bank  of  England  is  to  perform its  tasks  efficiently  as  well  as  regain  the  momentum and 
advantages it had acquired before its supervisory powers were transferred to the Financial Services 
Authority.
Key Words: monetary policy, supervision, Bank of England, FSA, external auditors, regulation, 
financial stability, Financial Crisis, Basel Core Principles, audits, capital markets, central banks
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A. Introduction
− „As a result of the recent banking crisis, the UK government announced a number of proposed changes to the 
UK financial  regulatory structure.  Following the proposed changes,  the Bank of England will  become the 
single authority with responsibility for preserving financial  stability and providing protection to the wider 
economy as a whole. In addition, under the proposed Financial Services Bill, the FSA will cease to exist in its 
current  form and  will  be  replaced by three  new bodies  -  the Financial  Policy Committee,  the Prudential 
Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority.“
As  highlighted  in  the  publications  and  the  book  “The  Role  of  the  External  Auditor  in  Bank 
Regulation  and  Supervision,“1 the  Financial  Services  Authority  (FSA)'s  statutory  objective  of 
maintaining confidence in the financial system is one that gave rise to concern. This largely being 
as a result of the reduced role which the Financial Services Authority’s predecessor, the Bank of 
England,  assumed in the supervisory process since 1997. Principle 19 of the Basel Core Principles 
highlights the importance of supervisors in acquiring and sustaining a thorough knowledge not only 
of individual  banks  and banking groups being regulated,  but  also of  the banking system in its 
entirety. Such supervisory role is considered to be a role which in my opinion, the Bank of England 
would have carried out more effectively than the then designated supervisor, the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA).
The FSA assumed responsibility for the regulatory functions of the Supervision and Surveillance 
Division of the Bank of England and these functions are those functions under the Banking Act 
1987. The Banking Act 1987 chapter 22, Part 1 section 1(1) gave to the Bank of England powers 
and the duty to supervise banks. Other banking supervisory functions which the Bank of England 
1 See both versions „The Role of the External Auditor in Bank Regulation and Supervision: A Comparative Analysis 
Between the UK, Germany, Italy and the US“ and  „The Role of the External Auditor in Bank Regulation and 
Supervision: A Global Perspective“
3Act 19982 transferred to the FSA are the functions of the Bank of England under the Banking 
Coordination Regulations 1992 and section 101(4) of the Building Societies Act 1986. Non banking 
supervision functions under listing of money market institutions and functions relating to listing of 
persons providing settlement arrangements were also transferred.3 
The  effectiveness  of  the  arrangement  (whereby  the  FSA sought  to  achieve  the  objective  of 
maintaining confidence in the financial system and the Bank of England continued responsibility 
for overall  stability of the financial  system) in dealing with systemic risks,  was put to  the test 
following the collapse of Northern Rock. The major criticism of the crisis at Northern Rock related 
to the tripartite arrangement between the Bank of England, the FSA and the Treasury. The apparent 
lack of clarity as regards the allocation of responsibilities between these authorities was revealed 
following the “buck-passing” and failure by appropriate authorities to promptly spot problems at 
Northern Rock. The Northern Rock crisis highlighted problems and flaws inherent in the tripartite 
arrangement between the Treasury, the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England for 
dealing with financial stability.4
 „Responsibility for the supervision of securities settlement systems and central counterparties will transfer to the Bank 
of England (the Bank) from the Financial Services Authority (FSA) following the enactment of the Financial Services 
Bill.  The transfer of responsibility is currently expected to take effect on 1 April 2013.“ 5
Hence, the Bank of England has been involved in (but not responsible for) the bank supervisory 
process through the process whereby it exchanges information with the FSA for bank supervisory 
purposes. In that sense, it still makes vital contribution to the regulatory and supervisory process. 
The exchange of information between the Bank of England and the FSA has constituted a vital 
principle6 since  the  Bank  of  England  stood  in  a  position  whereby it  could  provide  necessary 
information required for the FSA to function more effectively. Effective and regular communication 
is  therefore  required  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  Bank  provides  timely,  accurate  and  complete 
information when required and requested for. The FSA’s role, in the maintenance of confidence in 
2 Chapter 11 Part III section 21
3 ibid
4  See W Buiter ‘The Lessons from Northern Rock’ The Financial Times  Nov 13 2007
5 See Bank of England, „The Bank of England's Approach to the Supervision of Financial Market Infrasturctures“ 
December 2012 <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2012/nr161.pdf>
6  For more on these principles see the Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England 
and the Financial Services Authority (2006) paragraph 1
4the financial system has been vital since supervision of the financial system is a function which 
cannot be alienated from the function of the overall stability of the financial system. Furthermore, in 
order to supervise banks more effectively, knowledge of the workings of monetary dynamics is an 
essential tool. 
The flaws in the tripartite arrangement between the Bank of England, the FSA and the Treasury, as 
revealed during the Nothern Rock crisis, are however, not the only consequences which emanated 
as a result  of  the transfer of bank supervision from the Bank of England to  the FSA in 1997. 
Reduced communication between bank supervisors and external  auditors was  also a significant 
consequence which contributed to various issues which will later be higlighted in this paper. The 
introduction  of  section  39  reporting  accountants’ reports  in  the  Banking  Act  1987  and  related 
bilateral7 and trilateral8 meetings had given the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority's 
predecessor, additional powers for comprehensive and expert investigation of accounting and other 
records and internal control systems.9  Under the FSA, contact between auditors and itself declined 
from being routine and annual to an exceptional matter.10 This decline resulted from the FSA's risk-
based  approach  to  supervision.11 The  change  from section  39  reporting  accountants'  reports  to 
section 166 skilled persons'  reports also played a part.12 As a result,  in contrast to the Bank of 
England which regularly used auditors/reporting accountants to  help with supervision,  the FSA 
frequently used its own front-line supervisors for risk assessment purposes.13
The main benefit of an indirect system of supervision14 whereby the external auditor acts as an 
intermediary between the regulator and the regulated institutions is that it provides for the most 
effective means of obtaining and evaluating crucial information relating to the well-being of the 
financial institution.15 The FSA needed to develop better links with the market and consumers. From 
the  Treasury  Committee's  First  Report  on  Barings  Bank  and  International  Regulation,  it  was 
highlighted that the Bank of England, the FSA's predecessor, could not perform its main objective 
7 Between the Bank of England and banks
8 Between the Bank of England, banks and auditors
9 I P Dewing and P O Russell, The Role of Auditors, Reporting Accountants and Skilled Persons in UK Financial  
Services Supervision  Institute  of Chartered Accountants of Scotland  (2005) 105
10 Ibid pp 105 -107
11 ibid
12 ibid
13 Ibid p 107
14  The external auditors perform direct supervisory functions whilst the supervisor has indirect oversight responsibility 
and performs direct supervisory functions on important and not so regular occasions. See Huepkes 'The External 
Auditor and the Bank Supervisor' p 2
15  E Huepkes, 'The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor' p 12
5of protecting the financial system without assessment of the functioning of the firms in the market. 
Same applies to the FSA. In order to achieve its objectives to the financial system, public, market 
and consumers, the FSA needed to develop closer links with the market and consumers.
As well as developing better links with the market and consumers, the FSA has also required early 
warning indicators – indicators which its predecessor, the Bank of England was possibly better 
equipped with.16 So who could have helped to provide some solutions to the gap left as a result of 
the Bank of England's reduced involvement in the banking supervisory process? Whilst external 
auditors cannot provide early warning signals or perform market surveillance in the same capacity 
as central banks or regulators, they have valuable and vital third party knowledge of firms and the 
FSA would benefit immensely by exploiting such priceless expertise and knowledge. As a result, 
the external auditor could provide vital information and perform numerous specialised tasks at an 
individual firm level – if not at an industry level.17 
External  auditors  are  better  placed  to  carry  out  such  procedures  because  of  their  expertise  in 
analysing  risks  associated  with  internal  controls  in  banks  and  firms,  their  ability  to  validate 
processes in the measurement of credit,  market and operational risks under Basel II18 and their 
ability  to  undertake  other  specialised  functions  which  are  particularly  necessary  in  a  business 
environment in which computer technology and diverse risks have evolved. The FSA places great 
reliance on the cooperation of regulated firms to provide information which is timely, accurate and 
complete in order to be able to gauge whether a firm is complying with its requirements. Auditors 
can help facilitate efficiency within the supervisory process as they are also required under the 
FSMA to inform the FSA of certain matters of concern and have to provide annual reports to the 
FSA. The FSA in its proximity to the market and consumers would also need to be mindful of not 
getting 'captured' by those it is supposed to be regulating. 
However, the FSA's effectiveness in carrying out its bank supervisory functions has been impacted 
tremendously, not only because it is less equipped to handle the responsibility than the Bank of 
England, but because its risk based approach to supervision has also reduced the involvement of 
those  who could  have  assisted  it  in  effectively exercising  its  functions  –  namely,  the  external 
16  External  auditors  are  not  equipped  to  perform market  surveillance  in  the  same  capacity  as  central  banks  or 
regulators. The Bank of England's early warning indicators are based on monetary information provided by banks 
and other financial institutions under the Bank of England Act 1998. The external auditor could not gain access to 
such information. Market surveillance (industry level) is much wider than the relationship which the external auditor 
has  with the firm ( individual  firm level).  The FSA's early warning indicators are in form of annual  Financial 
Outlook reports for the domestic and international market place.
17  These tasks include the performance of tests of controls, sampling/substantive  procedures and verification of 
financial statements
18  See EHG Huepkes, ' The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor: “ Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson?” 
(2005) 7 (1/2) Journal of Banking Regulation  11
6auditors.
B. Arguments in Support of and Against the Separation of Monetary Policy From Bank 
Supervision
There have been numerous debates relating to whether responsibilities for monetary policy setting 
and supervision should be combined or alienated.  William Keegan highlights various  situations 
whereby „a reunion of responsibility for monetary policy and financial regulation“ have been called 
for.19 He also makes references to comments from outgoing and previous central bank chiefs such as 
Mervyn King and  William McChesney Martin.20 These comments could be inferred to highlight the 
importance  of  close  collaboration  between  monetary  setting  policies  and  supervisory 
responsibilities. Following the recent global Financial Crisis, the significance of such collaboration 
has been brought to greater light. Prior to the Crisis however, there had been many arguments in 
favour of an alienation between monetary policy setting responsibilities and those responsibilities 
related to supervision.21
As also highlighted in “The Role of the External Auditor in Bank Regulation and Supervision,“ and 
according to Briault, proponents of the 1997 transfer  to  the  FSA may argue in relation  to a 
conflict  of interest, and that a situation whereby the central bank acts as lender of last resort and 
sets monetary policies as well as supervisor, may give rise  to conflict of interest.22
However, Briault asserts that arguments against combining responsibilities for monetary policy and 
banking supervision in a single institution are unsustainable and that the real issue is whether the 
synergies  in  combining  banking  regulation  with  monetary  policy  are  greater  or  less  than  the 
alternative synergies arising from the creation of a single financial services regulator. He goes on to 
say that there may however be justification in some developing and transition countries, where the 
central bank stands (almost) alone as an institution with independence from political interference 
19 See W Keegan, „The Bank of England is Back in Charge: Let's Hope it's Concentrating“ < 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jun/20/william-keegan-bank-of-england-supervision> (last accessed 23 
December 2012)
20  „Mervyn King echoed and added to the dictum of a past Federal Reserve chairman, William McChesney Martin, 
when he said in his speech: "Just as the role of a central bank in monetary policy is to take the punchbowl away just 
as the party gets going, its role in financial stability should be to turn down the music when the dancing gets a little 
too wild.“
21 Also see K Whelan, „Should Monetary Policy Be Separated From Bank Supervision?“ December 2012 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201212/20121210ATT57788/20121210ATT57788EN.pdf
>
22  C Briault, 'The Rationale for a Single National Services Regulator' (1999)  2 Financial Services Authority London 
Occasional Paper  28
7and  also  has  the  resources  to  recruit  and  retain  high  calibre  staff.  He  adds  that  in  those 
circumstances,  the  effectiveness  of  financial  services  regulation  could  be  compromised  if  this 
function were removed from the central bank.
Benefits in having a single regulator for financial services (as exemplified and embodied by the 
FSA) amongst other things,  included better  management of risks generated by various types of 
businesses and their associations. This is an attribute which cannot be provided by the central bank 
–  whether  or  not  it  performs  just  the  sole  function  of  monetary  policy  setting  or  additional 
supervisory responsibilities. Likewise the knowledge and expertise of the central bank is something 
which cannot be generated by a single regulator. The main issue should be whether a particular 
jurisdiction  benefits  more  or  less  from  having  a  single  regulator  in  comparison  to  having  a 
functional regulator. In my opinion, the function of monetary policy setting is one which should be 
carried out by the central bank alone. In addition, the question of achieving the right design of 
regulatory structure of a particular jurisdiction will need to be examined against the background of a 
particular financial structure of each country rather than being generalised.23
According to Goodhart and Schoenmaker, there are many reasons in favour of the central bank also 
acting as supervisor24 and these are as follows: 
That the central bank must have concern for the efficient working of the payments system 
and that as a result, it should also supervise and regulate at least the main money-market 
commercial banks at the heart of the system; 
That any rescue or liquidity crises will usually require quick injection of cash-which can 
only be done by the central bank. For this reason, it  is argued that the central bank and 
supervisory  body  work  closely  together  and  that  this  can  best  be  achieved  through 
internalising the supervisory body within the central bank; and 
That separation would involve wasteful duplication as there is bound to be a lot of overlap 
between  areas  of  interest  of  and  information  required  by  and  accessible  to  both  the 
supervisor and the central bank. 
23 Also see C Goodhart and D Schoenmaker, ' Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies' 
(Financial Markets Group Special Papers 1992 ) 161
24 C  Goodhart  and  D  Schoenmaker,   '  Institutional  Separation  Between  Supervisory  and  Monetary  Agencies  ' 
(Financial Markets Group Special Papers 1992 )140-141; CAE Goodhart,  The Emerging Framework of Financial  
Regulation (1998) 249
8Arguments for separation include: 25
Where government financing is required for any large rescue, politicians and the Ministry of 
Finance are likely to be involved. For this reason, it  is important for the central bank to 
become more independent in the conduct of monetary policy and less politically involved in 
its supervisory role; 
That bank failures affect credibility and the central bank requires credibility in conducting 
its monetary policies; and 
Where concerns for the micro-level health and stability of parts of the banking system might 
affect the aim of the central bank’s conduct of monetary macro-policy – that is, where there 
is conflict of interest between the combination of monetary and regulatory function.
As  well  as  the  importance  and  significance  of  a  consideration  of  the  central  bank's  level  of 
involvement in political matters, the significance of political interference has been highlighted in 
the manner and conduct whereby the Bank's supervisory powers were transferred to the FSA in 
1997. Greater checks and mechanisms should exist to ensure that the Government does not decide 
on its own in the future, in respect of matters relating to sudden, surprising announcements and 
subsequent transfer of supervisory powers from the Bank of England to another authority. It might 
have seemed then (during the initial announcement of the transfer of powers in 1997), that the Bank 
had fallen short of its expectations and that a single regulator was in a better position to manage 
cross  sector  services  risks  more  effectively – however,  as  will  be  highlighted  in  the  following 
section, there were other underlining factors which were also contributory to problems faced by the 
FSA's financial and supervisory structures, amongst which include: the lack of bank resolution and 
deposit protection regimes. It could be argued that such possible shortcomings should have been 
considered and investigated before transferring powers to the FSA.
In the FSA's publication, „The Bank of England, Prudential Regulation  Authority: Our Approach to 
Banking Supervision“, several important lessons and shortcomings were drawn and acknowledged 
from previous regulatory failures:26
25 See ibid
26 FSA,  „The  Bank  of  England,  Prudential  Regulation   Authority:  Our  Approach  to  Banking  Supervision“ 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/financialstability/uk_reg_framework/pra_approach.
pdf page 7 of 27
9„The FSA’s supervisory approach prior to the financial crisis of 2007 rested on three assumptions. First, that the Basel 
capital  framework was  suitably calibrated  and thus  adherence to  its  capital  standard  would ensure  an institution’s 
stability; second, that access to wholesale market liquidity could always be achieved; and third, that senior management 
judgement and market discipline should not be ‘second guessed’ by supervisors. The FSA’s supervisory focus was thus 
on ensuring  that  firms  had  credible  systems  and  controls  to  equip management  to  exercise  its  responsibility.  The 
presumption was that supervisors should not be exercising judgement on what might happen in the future; this was for 
management. So supervisors limited their interventions to requiring compliance with detailed standards only if they 
were technically breached.
In other words, the supervisory approach was in essence reactive and it was designed and built around the premise that 
regulators should only intervene following observable failings relative to a set of rules rather than seek to prevent 
potential failure in the future.
The pre-crisis regime also lacked the necessary tools to support the orderly failure of a bank. There was no bank 
resolution regime and the deposit protection regime was not sufficient to ensure depositor confidence. Both of these two 
failings have been addressed in recent legislation.“
The FSA has also acknowledged that a transfer of bank supervisory powers back to the Bank of 
England does not serve as a guarantee that future crises would be prevented – since bank related 
crises had also occurred during the Bank's regime as supervisor. In response to the need to ensure 
that  adequate facilities are in place to facilitate the work of the Bank of England as well  as to 
strengthen the new regulatory system, further measures and investigations have been undertaken 
and are still being undertaken.27
In particular, several criticisms have been highlighted in relation to the Bank of England's inability 
to address certain issues during the recent Financial Crisis and these are as follows:28
– „That  the  Bank failed  to  take  action  as  the  credit  bubble  grew,  and indeed  stoked the 
excesses with too easy a monetary policy;
– That the inflation remit has been applied in an inconsistent, asymmetric and self-evidently 
ineffective manner. The MPC banked the external influences during the good years when it 
was depressing inflation, but asks us to look through these pressures now that it is adding to 
it;
– That the Bank compounded the loss of financial confidence in the early stages of the crisis 
by denying the banking system the liquidity support desperately needed to avert calamity. 
27 See HM Treasury, „A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Securing Stability Protecting Consumers“ January 
2012 <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/fin_fs_bill_policy_document_jan2012.pdf  >.   Also see Bank of England, 
„Bank of England's Approach to Supervision of Financial 
Infrastructures“<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2012/nr161.pdf>
28 See J Warner, „The Bank's Astonishing Escape From the Financial Crisis“ 28 May 
2011<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/jeremy-warner/8543319/The-Bank-of-Englands-astonishing-
escape-from-the-financial-crisis.html#>
10
Apparent fixation with the dangers of moral hazard caused the Bank to underestimate the 
seriousness of the crisis until it was too late;
– Lack of governance;
– Straying into the political sphere by apparently backing Conservative plans for front-end-
loaded deficit reduction.“
In view of the above criticisms, several calls have been made for adequate investigations to be 
undertaken before thrusting even greater powers and responsibilities to the Bank of England. Even 
though it appears that the Bank of England is better equipped to deal with bank supervisory matters 
than the Financial Services Authority, it is not immune from flaws and weaknesses which have also 
impacted the FSA's credibility and ability to act  prudently and effectively as a single financial 
services regulator.
Having highlighted the above criticisms, one of the major reasons which could be advanced in 
support  of  the  Bank of  England's  capacity  and ability  to  effectively exercise  bank supervisory 
responsibilities – at least to a greater extent than the FSA, will be discussed in the following section.
C. How the Financial Services Authority (FSA) Regime Has Affected the Involvement of 
External Auditors in the Bank Supervisory Process
It is hoped that the transfer of bank supervision back to the Bank of England will signal the return 
of  greater  communication  between  auditors  and  bank  supervisors  –  whose  frequency  of 
communication has declined during the FSA'S regime as supervisor. It was highlighted under the 
introductory section that as well as developing better links with the market and consumers, the FSA 
also required early warning indicators – indicators which its predecessor, the Bank of England was 
possibly better equipped with. 
As well as the reduced level communication between external auditors and bank supervisors during 
the FSA's regime, another concern relates to the Bank of England's ability to regain the level of 
expertise it had in its dealings with the financial services industry. According to the Economist,29 
„One concern is that the bank has lost too much of the tacit knowledge of the workings of the 
29 The Economist, „The Bank of England_The Old Lady Bulks Up: Britain’s Central Bank Is About to Become Even 
More Powerful. Its New Boss Will Find it Harder to Run“ September 1 2012 
<http://www.economist.com/node/21561944>
11
financial-services  industry needed  to  be  a  good all-round  regulator.  When  the  bank  took over 
interest-rate policy from the Treasury in 1997, it gave up its role as manager of public debt as well 
as its job supervising banks. That reduced the contact between bank staff and the City. And the 
primacy  of  the  inflation  mandate  diminished  the  status  of  the  bank’s  financial-stability  wing. 
Ambitious youngsters steered clear; some experienced staff left. When crisis struck, the bank was 
stuffed with smart economists but short of folk with a feel for finance. It will take time to restore the 
balance. A bigger worry now is that the proliferation of committees will lead to internal strife........“
The role and impact of audits, auditors and accounting in the bank supervisory process is further 
illustrated thus:
„Accounting and auditing is what underpins the capital markets,  the uninitiated cannot see it.“30 
Furthermore, as stated in the Committee's Report,31 „ Adequate and timely dialogue between bank 
auditors  and  supervisors  is  of  the  first  importance.   The  provisions  of  the  1987 Act  explicitly 
concerned communication  between the auditors  and the  Bank of  England,  which was then  the 
supervisory authority. The transfer in 1997 of this responsibility from the Bank to the Financial 
Services  Authority meant  that  the relevant  provisions  needed to  be reenacted in  the legislation 
implementing the transfer,  so as to ensure the necessary dialogue between the auditors and the 
FSA.“32
Following an acknowledgement that „the FSA had also in made much less frequent use of skilled 
persons' reports as a routine supervisory tool [these having been another innovation of the 1987 
Act], that the regular meetings that these had previously engendered helpfully reinforced the links 
between the auditor and supervisor, that the auditor has an important role to play in the regulatory 
framework, and that an effective relationship between the two parties needed to be re-established“, 
30 See House of Lords (Lords Select Committees) : Auditors: Market concentration and their role - Economic Affairs 
Committee_ CHAPTER 6: Bank audits and the financial crisis , See reference to Professor Beattie's remarks. 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldeconaf/119/11909.htm>
31 Ibid paragraphs 155 and 159
32 „  It  was also noted in the Committee's  Report that „However,  in practice the regular dialogue which had been 
working well following the passage of the 1987 Act appeared to fall into desuetude following the 1997 transfer of 
supervisory responsibility from the Bank to the FSA.  Of the three troubled banks which subsequently had to be 
bailed out by the taxpayer—Northern Rock, HBoS and the Royal Bank of Scotland, the Committee was informed 
that in 2006,  there was not a single meeting between the FSA and the external auditors of either Northern Rock 
(PwC) or HBoS (KPMG), and only one meeting between the auditor of RBS (Deloitte) and the FSA; and that in the 
whole of 2007 there was only one FSA/auditors meeting with each bank auditor. Even in 2008 there were only two 
meetings between the FSA and the auditors of Northern Rock and HBoS and none between the FSA and the auditors 
of  RBS.  As  the  FSA admitted  to  us,  "the  regular  practice  of  auditor-supervisor  meetings  fell  away gradually 
following the transition from the Bank of England to the FSA as banking supervisor.“ see ibid at paragraph 160
12
a draft code for the relationship between the external auditor and supervisor was duly published by 
the FSA for guidance consultation in February 2011.33 Furthermore, it was conceded that a Code of 
Practice would be insufficient to address the issues at hand and that a statutory obligation would 
also be required.
D. Conclusion
There  has  always  been  a  strong  conviction  and  argument  for  the  case  that  bank  supervisory 
functions should have been left under the ambit of the Bank of England. The Bank was simply 
better endowed with greater expertise and knowledge of individual banks than any other authority 
could have acquired. A loss of a significant level of its supervisory functions not only resulted in 
reduced communication between bank supervisors and external auditors, but also deprived it  of 
consolidating upon its vital capital knowledge of the workings of the  financial (and particularly the 
banking) services industry. The reduced involvement of external auditors in the supervisory process 
has also dealt a significant blow in the efficient regulation of the financial services industry. The 
need for effective supervision of capital markets is becoming all the more evident in the aftermath 
of the recent LIBOR and rate rigging scandals.   Financial  regulators or indeed bank regulators 
cannot perform such a function effectively without the involvement of auditors in the supervisory 
process.  A challenging  task  awaits  the  incoming Bank of  England Governor,  Mark  Carney34 – 
however, he (as well as other recently implemented reforms) may prove to be the much needed 
boost required in the bank, and indeed financial supervisory process.
33 See ibid paragraphs 162 -163
34 Who resumes his position as from the 1st July 2013
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